We investigate in details a Trejos-Wright random matching model of money with a consumer take-it-or-leave-it o¤er and the individual money holding set f0; 1; 2g. First we show generic existence of three kinds of steady states: (1) pure-strategy full-support steady states, (2) mixed-strategy full-support steady states, and (3) non-full-support steady states, and then we show relations between them. Finally we provide stability analyses. It is shown that (1) and (2) are locally stable, (1) being also determinate. (3) is shown to be unstable. (JEL classi…cation: C62, C78, E40)
Introduction
Trejos and Wright (1995) shows the existence of a monetary steady state in a random matching model under the assumption that an agent's money holding is in f0; 1g. In the same model, for consumer take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers and for money holdings in f0; 1;
; Bg, Zhu (2003) provides su¢ cient conditions for existence of a full-support monetary steady state with a strictly increasing and strictly concave value function. By way of a variant of a neutrality argument, his result also implies the existence of non-full-support steady states in which all agents treat bundles of money, each bundle being B=l 2 N units, as the smallest unit held and traded.
Among the questions that Zhu's existence result leaves open are the following. First, are his full-support steady states unique? Second, do both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy steady states exist generically? Third, are full-support steady states stable? Fourth, are the above non-full-support steady states stable? The smallest set of money holdings for which these questions arise is f0; 1; 2g, the smallest set for which the distribution of money holdings over people depends on the trades that are made. For this set, we answer all but the …rst question.
Under a condition that is weaker than Zhu's su¢ cient conditions, a fullsupport steady state exists. Both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy fullsupport steady states exist generically and any full-support steady state is stable. The non-full-support steady state, which necessarily has support f0; 2g, is unstable. Although the two-unit bound is restrictive, it, at least, provides conjectures for the general case.
The Zhu (2003) model
Time is discrete, dated as t 0. There is a unit measure of non-atomic agents who are in…nitely-lived. Also, there are divisible and non-storable consumption goods at each date. Each agent maximizes expected discounted utility with discount factor 2 (0; 1). At each date, if an agent produces an amount q 0 of the good, the utility cost is q. If an agent consumes an amount q 0 of the good, the period utility he gets is u(q), where u : R + ! R is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously di¤erentiable on R + . Also, u(0) = 0, u 0 (1) = 0 and u 0 (0) is su¢ ciently large but …nite. 1 These 1 The assumption u 0 (0) < 1 is used only in the proof of proposition 2.
1 assumptions imply that there is a unique x > 0 such that u( x) = x. There exists a …xed stock of indivisible money that is perfectly durable. There is a bound on individual money holdings, denoted B 2 N, so the individual money-holding set is B f0; 1; ; Bg. Let m 2 (0; 1) denote the per capita stock of money divided by the bound on individual money holdings so that the per capita stock is Bm.
In each period, agents are randomly matched in pairs. With probability 1=n, where n 2, an agent is a consumer (producer) and the partner is a producer (consumer). Such meetings are called single-coincidence meetings. With probability 1 2=n, the match is a no-coincidence meeting. 2 In meetings, agents'money holdings are observable, but any other information about an agent's trading history is private.
Consider a date-t single-coincidence meeting between a consumer (potential buyer) with i units of money (pre-trade) and a producer (potential seller) with j units of money (pre-trade), an (i; j)-meeting. If i > 0 and j < B, the meeting is called a trade meeting. In trade meetings, the consumer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. (There are no lotteries.) The producer accepts or rejects the o¤er. If the producer rejects it, both sides leave the meeting and go on to the next date.
For each k 2 B, let w t k be the expected discounted value of holding k units of money prior to date-t matching. Using w t k 's, the consumer's problem in an (i; j)-meeting is
where (i; j) fp 2 Bjp minfi; B jgg is the set of feasible payments. As (2) holds with equality in the solution, the consumer's problem reduces to f t (i; j) max
Because the solution P t (i; j) may be multi-valued, Zhu introduces randomization. Let t (i; j) denote the set of probability distributions on P t (i; j). A mapping t is called (consumer's) optimal strategy if it maps each (i; j) 2 B B to an element of t (i; j), so that X p2P t (i;j) t (p; i; j) = 1.
For each z 2 B, let t z denote the fraction of agents holding z units of money at the start of period t, so that t is a probability distribution on B with mean Bm. Given a strategy, the law of motion for t+1 can be expressed as
The second term of (5) tells who in single-coincidence meetings will end up with z units: consumers who originally had i units and spent i z units and producers who originally had j units and acquired z j units. The value function w t satis…es the Bellman equation
The …rst term of the r.h.s corresponds to either entering a no-coincidence meeting or becoming a producer, who is indi¤erent between trading and not trading. When i = 0, equation ( ; w t B ). Finally, we allow free disposal of money and consider equilibria in which agents are not willing to throw away money. That is, the value function must be nondecreasing in every period:
De…nition 1 Given 0 , an equilibrium is a sequence f( t ; w t )g 1 t=0 that satis…es the consumer's optimality condition (4), the law of motion (5), the Bellman equation (6) , and non-disposal of money (7) . A tuple ( ; w) is a monetary steady state if ( t ; w t ) = ( ; w) for t 0 is an equilibrium and w 6 = 0. Pure-strategy steady states are those for which (3) has a unique solution for all meetings. Other steady states are called mixed-strategy steady states. 
Our proposition says that (8) is also necessary and su¢ cient for existence of a full-support steady state in economy B = 2. To state it, it is helpful to express 0 and 2 in terms of 1 using P i = 1 and
where 1 2 [0; 2 minfm; 1 mg]:
Throughout this paper, the dependence of on 1 is kept implicit to simplify the notations. First we state two key equations regarding 1 , w 1 and w 2 :
and
For a given 1 , equation (11) has at most one positive solution for w 1 . If it has a positive solution for w 1 , then equation (12) de…nes positive w 2 . Let
and let (w 1 ; w 2 ) denote the positive solution to (11)-(12) for 1 = 1 . (8) 
Proposition 1 Inequality
It is a unique pure-strategy full-support steady state and is given by ( ; w ).
Otherwise there is a mixed-strategy full-support steady state.
When is su¢ ciently close to one, the pure-strategy full-support steady state exists. To see this, …x all parameters except and let = . As ! 1, equation (11) approaches w 1 = u(w 1 ), (12) approaches w 2 = 2w 1 , and (14) approaches u(2w 1 ) < u(w 1 ) + w 1 . By strict concavity of u, this last inequality holds and hence the pure-strategy full-support steady state exists.
Although those inequality conditions for existence are stated in terms of primitives, it is helpful to have an example to show that (14) may or may not hold. Let n = 2, and u(y) = y 1=2 . For such utility function, (11) and (12) can be explicitly solved, and the condition (14) for (m; ) can be explicitly derived. Figure ? ? shows that there are open regions of (m; ) in which (14) holds and regions in which it does not hold. Moreover, this ought to be true for u functions "close to" u(y) = y 1=2 . This implies genericity of both kinds of full-support steady states.
Although the full-support steady states computed in …gure ?? seem to be unique, we have been unable to establish such uniqueness in general. Nor do we have an example of multiplicity.
Stability
Our stability criterion is as follows.
De…nition 2 A steady state ( ; w) is locally stable if there is a neighborhood of such that for any initial distribution in the neighborhood, there is an equilibrium path such that ( t ; w t ) ! ( ; w). A locally stable steady state is determinate, if for each initial distribution in this neighborhood, there is only one equilibrium that converges to it.
This de…nition of stability only requires convergence of some equilibria, not all equilibria. This is because there are always equilibria that do not converge to a given monetary steady state. In particular, a non-monetary equilibrium always exists from any initial condition.
Notice that the above de…nition of local stability implies that the valuedmoney steady state in the Trejos-Wright f0; 1g model is stable, because there is no 'neighborhood'of the steady state. Also, for that model, the only nonexplosive path converging to that steady state is the one in which the value of money remains constant, which implies determinacy of that steady state. 3 The following is our stability results for the f0; 1; 2g economy.
Proposition 2 Full-support steady states are locally stable. The non-fullsupport steady state is unstable. Moreover, the pure-strategy full-support steady state is determinate.
The standard approach to stability analysis of di¤erence equation systems (see, for example, [5] ) is to compare the number of eigenvalues of the dynamical system that are strictly smaller than one in absolute value, say a, and the number of initial conditions, say b. If a = b (a > b), then there is a unique (an in…nity of) convergent path(s). If a < b, then there is no convergent solution. This standard approach is applied to establish local stability of the pure-strategy full-support steady state.
The stability of mixed-strategy steady state is proved by showing that the mixed-strategy steady state can be attained in one step. The statement about non-full-support steady state shows that if the economy starts with a positive measure of people holding one unit of money, then the economy does not converge to the steady state in which a bundle of two units of money is treated as one in f0; 1g model. The proof is by way of contradiction and relies on two features. First, the dynamical system necessarily involves unitroot convergence because the out ‡ow from holdings of 1 unit, which comes from (1; 1)-meetings, approaches zero as the frequency of such meetings goes to zero. Second, the non-full-support steady state is on the boundary of the state space in two senses: the distribution does not have full support and the value of money is not strictly increasing. Hence, a convergent sequence must at all dates satisfy t 1 0 and (7).
Proofs
Before turning to the proofs, we set out some steady state consequences that we use in the proofs. The steady-state law of motion reduces to
6 which equates out ‡ows from holdings of 1 (the lefthand side) to in ‡ows into holdings of 1 (the righthand side). The Bellman equations are
As to full-support steady states, Lemma 1 will establish that zero-unit payment is suboptimal and one-unit payment is optimal in all trade meetings in any full-support steady state, two-unit payment in (2; 0)-meetings being also optimal for a mixed-strategy full-support steady state. Corresponding inequalities are
If these inqualities hold, the Bellman equation (16)-(17) becomes (11)-(12). Claims 1 and 2 are used in lemma 1.
Claim 1 If equations (11) and (12) are satis…ed for some such that 1 > 0, then (18) and (22) hold.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that (18) does not hold:
Then, we have
where the …rst inequality is by substituting the supposition into (11) and the second is by u(0) = 0 and strict concavity of u. This is contradiction and thus (18) should hold. Inequality (22) follows from
where the …rst and the third inequalities are by (12) and the second is (18). Lemma 1 For any monetary steady state with a full-support distribution, the solution set to (3) for (2,0)-meetings is either f1g or f1; 2g. The solution set to (3) for other trade meetings is f1g. Any monetary steady state with a non-full-support distribution has w 1 = 0 and w 2 that is the unique positive solution to
Proof. We need to show that any full-support monetary steady state satis…es (18)-(22). We start from (18) and assume by way of contradiction that it does not hold. Then (19) must hold, because substituting (19) with a reversed weak inequality and the supposition into (16) gives 0 = w 1 = w 2 , a contradiction to being a monetary steady state. Then the supposition and (19) gives
Note that (19) implies 0 < w 1 < x, with x = u( x). Thus we have 0 w 2 w 1 < x, which in turn implies (20) with weak inequality. This weak inequality and (25) gives (22). Because u is strictly concave, that (18) does not hold implies u( w 2 ) u( w 1 ) < w 1 . This together with (22) implies (1; 2; 0) = 1. For 1 to be strictly positive in (15), we must have (1; 1; 1) > 0 and hence our supposition implies (18) must hold with equality. So far, trading one unit of money is optimal in all trade meetings. Bellman equation (16) Now we turn to full-support steady states. First we show necessity of (8) . By lemma 1, full-support steady states satisfy (18)-(22). If all these optimality conditions are substituted into (16) and (17), then one can get (11), which must have a (unique) positive solution for some 1 > 0. Di¤er-entiating (11) at w 1 = 0 gives the necessary and su¢ cient condition for such existence:
Subtracting the r.h.s. of (8) from the r.h.s. of (26) gives
Therefore (8) is implied by (26) and is necessary. Now we consider su¢ ciency. Our argument uses the intermediate value theorem to show the existence of full-support steady state. Under (8), when 1 = 0, (11) and (12) have a (unique) positive solution (ŵ 1 ;ŵ 2 ). Di¤erenti-ation at such a solution gives
Then by the mean value theorem, we have
where the second inequality follows from (12) and (27). Therefore (ŵ 1 ;ŵ 2 ) satis…es u( ŵ 1 ) + ŵ 1 > u( ŵ 2 ).
As 1 increases, the solution (ŵ 1 ;ŵ 2 ) as a function of 1 changes continuously. Suppose that there exists 1 2 (0; 1 ) such that the l.h.s. and r.h.s. of (26) are equal and such that (ŵ 1 ;ŵ 2 ) exists for all 1 2 (0; 1 ). 4 For such 1 , the r.h.s. of (11) as a function of w 1 should be tangent to the l.h.s., and therefore, as 1 approaches 1 , (ŵ 1 ;ŵ 2 ) approaches a zero vector. Di¤erentiating (11) for = 1 at w 1 = 0 gives
where the coe¢ cient of u 0 (0) is proven to be smaller than one for any n > 0. This implies
Concavity of u and (12) give the following inequality:
Because by (29) the above limit is strictly smaller than zero, we have u( ŵ 1 )+ ŵ 1 < u( ŵ 2 ), for 1 su¢ ciently close to 1 . In this case, the intermediate value theorem can be applied, and we can …nd a 1 > 0 such that the solution satis…es
Suppose now that such 1 does not exist, so that the positive solution to (11)-(12) (ŵ 1 ;ŵ 2 ) exists for all 1 2 and in particular for 1 = 1 . If (14) fails to hold so we have u( ŵ 1 ) + ŵ 1 u( ŵ 2 ), for 1 = 1 , then again the the intermediate value theorem implies (31) for some 1 .
Finally we show that such pair ( ;ŵ) that satis…es (31) is a mixedstrategy full-support steady state. Claim 1 implies (18) We show that if we have (14), then ( ; w ) is a pure-strategy full-support steady state. Claim 1 implies (18) and (22). Then claim 2 gives the remaining conditions (19)-(20). Therefore transferring one unit is strictly preferred in all trade meetings. By lemma 1, it is the unique pure-strategy full-support steady state.
Overall, a mixed-strategy steady state exist when pure-strategy steady state doesn't.
Proof of Proposition 2. First we show stability of the mixed-strategy fullsupport steady state. Suppose that the initial distribution 0 1 is su¢ ciently close to the steady state distribution 1 . For the mixed-strategy steady state, agents can choose the initial randomization 0 (1; 2; 0) so that does not a¤ect agents' decisions.) Thus the mixed-strategy steady state is stable.
The proof of stability of the pure-strategy full-support steady state and the proof of instability of the non-full-support steady state share some common procedures. First, we will pin down the optimal trading strategy along a possible convergent equilibrium path. Based on that strategy, we construct a dynamical system and use linear approximation to study its dynamic properties.
For the pure-strategy full-support steady state, trading one unit in all trade meetings is a strictly preferred strategy at the steady state (see De…-nition 1 and Lemma 1), so it is also optimal in its neighborhood. That is, t (1; 1; 0) = t (1; 1; 1) = t (1; 2; 1) = t (1; 2; 0) = 1 for all t 0. Similarly, we can also pin down the optimal trading strategy that is constantly played along a path that converges to the non-full-support steady state, if there is any such path. To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that there exists an equilibrium path that converges to the non-full-support steady state (i.e., 1 = 0 and w 1 = 0) from some initial distribution such that 0 1 6 = 0. As is shown in the proof of proposition 1, trading one unit is strictly preferred in (1; 1)-and (2; 1)-meetings, and paying two units is strictly preferred in (2; 0)-meetings at ( ; w). Therefore, they are also optimal in the neighborhood of ( ; w), so t (1; 1; 1) = t (1; 2; 1) = t (2; 2; 0) = 1 for all t 0. Moreover, the following argument shows t (1; 1; 0) = 1 should be the case for all t 0. When the economy is close to but not equal to ( ; w), we have t 1 > 0 for all t 0 so (6) implies w t 1 > 0 for all t > 0, because there is always a positive probability that consumer with one unit meets producer with one unit and the consumer can get positive amount of utility from such a meeting. Equation (8) implies u(x) > x for all x < w 2 and therefore u( w In both cases, a unique strategy is constantly played along any potential convergent path, so we can construct dynamic system from the law of motion 12 and Bellman equation under the given strategy:
We have u( w
2 ) and (1; 2; 0) = 0 for the non-fullsupport steady state, and u( w 
Its jacobian is
Straightforward di¤erentiation leads to
Thus the pure-strategy steady state has an eigenvalue strictly less than one and the non-full-support steady state has a unit eigenvalue. In what follows, we will compute the other two eigenvalues for the pure-strategy steady state and then turn to the non-full-support steady state.
For the pure-strategy steady state, we have (1; 2; 0) = 1, and straightforward di¤erentiation gives
(37) where w w 2 w 1 . This matrix is generically invertible, con…rming that the application of the implicit function theorem and (35) are valid. Because the top-right submatrix of A is a zero matrix, one eigenvalue of A is given by (36), which is smaller than one, and the other two eigenvalues are those of ( w ) 1 , which are the reciprocals of eigenvalues of w . In what follows, we are going to show that eigenvalues of w are smaller than one in absolute value.
That the slope of the r.h.s. of (11) at the positive …xed point w 1 should be smaller than the slope of the l.h.s. gives
The eigenvalues of a general 2 2 matrix a b c d are given by
both eigenvalues are real. They are smaller than one in absolute value if and only if a + d < 2 and (1 a)(1 d) bc > 0. Checking these conditions for (37) gives
(1 a)(1 d) bc
where the last inequalities of the above two conditions follow from (38). Therefore, the eigenvalues of ( w ) 1 are greater than one in absolute value. This full-support steady state has a one-dimensional stable manifold. Because we have one initial condition, this full-support steady state is locally stable and determinate.
Next we consider the non-full-support steady state. Equation (36) computes the unit eigenvalue for the law of motion. Furthermore, as …gure ?? illustrates, the law of motion (32) features unit-root convergence; the slope at the …xed point is unity. Note also that this steady state is on the boundary of the state space W , which makes it necessary to explictly study the limiting behavior by seeing the eigenspace of the linearized system (35). 
Since 0 1 6 = 0 and the law of motion has unit root convergence, the convergence trajectory will eventually be parallel to the eigenspace of (40) associated with the unit eigenvalue 6 . The associated eigenvector, which constitutes a base of the space, has the form 2 In the context of the discrete-time dynamical system theory, the unit root is a "border"case in which the higher-order terms should be examined. In our case, the higher-order term seems to imply unit-root convergence (i.e., Figure  ? ?). However, the fact that convergent trajectory of ( 
Concluding remarks
We show that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the monetary steady state of the Trejos-Wright f0; 1g economy, namely (8) , is also necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of a full-support steady state of the f0; 1; 2g economy, showing that Zhu (2003)'s su¢ cient condition is not necessary for the bound of two. Moreover, both the pure-strategy and mixed-strategy fullsupport steady states are generic. Given our result, a reasonable conjecture should be that even for a higher bound, the condition (8) is necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of full-support steady states. For values of parameters that lead to lower values of money (i.e., high n, low and high m), randomizations may simply occur.
Generalizing Proposition 2 to a higher bound case is not simple. When the bound is two, we can identify candidate strategies that support steady states and get explicit expressions for the relevant di¤erence-equation system. For a general bound, we do not know the supporting strategies. Therefore, if analogue proofs are to be provided, they must be constructed di¤erently. 7 
